Intentional Agent Patterns with the PRACTIONIST Framework

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Abstract

When developing BDI agent-based systems, some design patterns such as incompatible intentions, multiple strategies, intention decomposition, etc. would be very useful in order to catch some desired agent behaviours. As BDI agent programmers, our desire would be to have a framework that natively support such common patterns.

The PRACTIONIST framework provides a goal-oriented approach for developing agent systems according to the BDI model. In this paper we first describe the goal model of PRAC-TIONIST agents and how they use such a model to reason about goals during their deliberation process and means-ends reasoning. Then, we show how some useful BDI agent patterns can be directly and actually implemented with our framework, which natively supports such design-level solutions. In other words, in our framework we wanted solve some common design problems, by providing some built-in solutions that programmers can easily adopt when developing their intentional agents.

1 Introduction

One of the most interesting agent models is the BDI [13], which derives from the philosophical tradition of practical reasoning. It states that agents decide, moment by moment, which actions to perform in order to pursue their goals. Practical reasoning involves a deliberation process, to decide what states of affairs to achieve, and a means-ends reasoning, to decide how to achieve them.

When developing BDI agent-based systems, some common design problems are often addressed at several levels of abstraction (i.e. organization, agent, task and so forth). According to [15] design patterns are explicit formulations of good proven solutions to recurring problems that arise within some contexts. Thus patterns make easies the reuse of good software design. A design pattern explains the insight and good practices that have evolved to solve a given problem and it provides a concise definition of common elements, context, and essential requirements for a solution [8]. Moreover, patterns reduce the development time, communicate knowledge and help people to learn a new design paradigm[14]. The adoption of design patterns also improves the quality of software, as they are validated by the experience rather than from testing [6].

Some common design patterns such as incompatible intentions, multiple strategy, intention decomposition, etc. would be very useful in order to catch some desired behaviours of intentional agents. Unfortunately, some BDI agent frameworks do not directly support such patterns and usually require too much work to actually implemented them. As BDI agent programmers, our desire would be to have a framework that natively support such patterns.

We believe that the explicit representation of goals and the ability to reason about them play an important role in the definition of several intentional design patterns.

Therefore our PRACTIONIST framework [9] adopts a goal-oriented approach to develop BDI agents and stresses the separation between the deliberation process and the means-ends reasoning, with the abstraction of goal used to formally define both desires and intentions during the deliberation phase. In PRACTIONIST a goal is considered as an analysis, design, and implementation abstraction compliant to the semantics described in this paper. In other words, agents can be

programmed in terms of goals, which then will be related to either desires or intentions according to whether some specific conditions are satisfied or not.

Actually, other BDI agent platforms natively use the concept of goal (e.g. JACK [2] and JAM [5] use goals instead of desires). However, the actual implementations of mental states differ somewhat from their original semantics: desires (or goals) are treated as event types (such as in AgentSpeak(L) [11]) or procedures (such as in 3APL [4]) and intentions are executing plans. Therefore the deliberation process and means-ends reasoning are not well separated, as being committed to an intention (ends) is the same as executing a plan (means). In our view, this reduces the opportunity of defining useful design patterns. [16],

Moreover, since some available BDI agent platforms do not support the explicit representation and implementation of goals or desires with their properties and relations, the ability to reason about goals is lost, along with the ability to know if goals are impossible, achieved, incompatible with other goals, and so forth. Thus, even the support for the *commitment strategies* of agents and their ability to autonomously drop, reconsider, replace or pursue goals is strongly decreased.

Only a few BDI agent platforms deal with declarative goals, such as JADEX, where goals are explicitly represented according to a generic model, enabling the agents to handle their life cycle and reasoning about them [1]. Nevertheless, the model defined in JADEX does not deal with relations among goals.

In the following sections we show that some useful BDI agent patterns can be directly and actually implemented with the PRACTIONIST framework, which natively supports some design-level solutions. In other words, in our framework we wanted solve some of most common design problems at the agent level, by providing some built-in solutions that programmers can easily adopt when developing their agents.

Therefore, in this paper we first present a brief overview of the general structure of PRACTION-IST agents and their execution model (section 2) and the definition of the goal model (section 3). Then we describe how PRACTIONIST agents are able to reason about available goals according to their goal model, current beliefs, desires, and intentions (section 4). Finally, some agent-level design patterns are presented and the implementation with the PRACTIONIST framework is briefly illustrated (section 5). The last section outlines some conclusions and our intentions about further and future work.

2 PRACTIONIST Agents

The PRACTIONIST framework, defined on top of JADE¹, supports the development of BDI agents endowed with the following elements (figure 1):

- a set of *perceptors* that listen to some relevant external stimuli (*perceptions*);
- a set of *beliefs* (represented through a prolog-like language) that the agent has got about both its internal state and the external environment;
- a goal model including: (i) a set of goals each agent could pursue, which represent some states of affairs to bring about or activities to perform and can be related to either *desires* or *intentions*; and (ii) a set of goal relations to use during its deliberation process and means-ends reasoning;
- a set of *plans* that are the means to achieve the intentions;
- a set of *actions* the agent can perform to act over its environment; and
- a set of *effectors* that actually execute such actions.

In the PRACTIONIST framework plans represent an important container in which developers define the actual behaviours and strategies of agents. Each agent may own a declared set of plans (the *plan library*), each specifying the course of *acts* the agent will undertake in order to pursue its intentions, or to handle incoming perceptions, or to react to changes of its beliefs.

¹http://jade.tilab.com



Figure 1: PRACTIONIST Agent Architecture.

PRACTIONIST plans have a set of properties, which the agents can use during their meansends reasoning and the actual execution of their activities. Some of these slots are: the *trigger event*, which defines the event (i.e. goals, perceptions, and belief updating) each plan is supposed to handle; the *context*, a set of conditions that must be believed true before performing the plan; the *body*, which include the acts the agent performs during the execution of the plan. Within the body several acts are possible, such as *sending* messages, *desiring* to bring about some states of affairs or perform some action, modifying beliefs, and so forth.

Further details about the structure of PRACTIONIST agents and its components can be found in [9].

During its main cycle the agent performs the following steps:

- 1. through the perceptors, it searches for perceptions from the environment and transforms them into (external) *events*, which in turn are put into an event queue;
- 2. it selects and extracts an event from such a queue, according to some logic;
- 3. it handles the selected event through the following means-ends reasoning process: (i) the agent figures out the practical plans, which are those plans whose trigger event matches the selected event; (ii) among practical plans, the agent detects the applicable ones, which are those plan whose context is believed true, and selects one of them (the main plan); (iii) it builds the intended means, which will contain the main plan and the other alternative practical plans. Each intented means is put within a stack according to the following criteria: if the event that has generated the intended means is related to the intention to pursue a goal, it is put on top of the intended means.

It should be noted that every intended means stack can contain several intended means, each able to handle a given event, possibly through several alternative means. Moreover all intended means stacks are *concurrently* executed, so that each PRACTIONIST agent can perform several activities in parallel.

3 Goal Model

In the PRACTIONIST framework, a goal is an objective to pursue and we use it as a mean to transform desires into intentions through the satisfaction of some properties. In other words, our agents are programmed in terms of goals, which then will be related to either desires or intentions according to whether some specific conditions are satisfied or not.

Formally, a PRACTIONIST $goal \ g$ is defined as follows:

$$g = \langle \sigma_g, \ \pi_g \rangle \tag{1}$$

where:

- σ_g is the success condition of the goal g;
- π_q is the possibility condition of the goal g stating whether g can be achieved or not.

Since we consider such elements as local properties of goals, in the PRACTIONIST framework we defined them as operations that have to be implemented for each kind of goal (figure 5).

In order to describe the goal model, we first provide some definitions about the properties of goals.

Definition 1 A goal g_1 is *inconsistent* with a goal g_2 $(g_1 \perp g_2)$ if and only if when g_1 succeeds, then g_2 fails.

Definition 2 A goal g_1 entails a goal g_2 or equivalently g_2 is entailed by g_1 ($g_1 \rightarrow g_2$) if and only if when g_1 succeeds, then also g_2 succeeds.

Definition 3 A goal g_1 is a *precondition* of a goal g_2 ($g_1 \mapsto g_2$) if and only if g_1 must succeed in order to be possible to pursue g_2 .

Definition 4 A goal g_1 depends on a goal g_2 ($g_1 \hookrightarrow g_2$) if and only if g_2 is precondition of g_1 and g_2 must be successful while pursuing g_1 .

Therefore the dependence is a stronger form of precondition. Both definitions let us specify that some goals must be successful before (and during, in case of dependency) pursuing some other goals (refer to section 4 for more details).

Now, given a set G of goals and based on the above definitions, it is also possible to define some relations between those goals.

Definition 5 The inconsistency $\Gamma \subseteq G \times G$ is a binary symmetric relation on G, defining goals that are inconsistent with each other. Formally,

$$\Gamma = \{ (g_i, g_j) \mid i, j = 1, ..., |G| : g_i \perp g_j \}.$$
(2)

When two goals are inconsistent with each other, it might be useful to specify that one is preferred to the other. We denote that g_i is preferred to g_j with $g_i \succ g_j$.

Definition 6 The relation of preference $\Gamma' \subseteq \Gamma$ defines the pair of goals (g_i, g_j) where $g_i \perp g_j$ and $g_i \succ g_j$. Formally,

$$\Gamma' = \{ (g_i, g_j) \in \Gamma : g_i \succ g_j \}.$$
(3)

Therefore if there is no preference between two inconsistent goals, the corresponding pair does not belong to the set Γ' . Moreover, since several goals can be pursued in parallel, there is no need to prefer some goal to another goal if they are not inconsistent each other.

Definition 7 The entailment $\Xi \subseteq G \times G$ is a binary relation on G, defining which goals entail other goals. Formally,

$$\Xi = \{ (g_i, g_j) \mid i, j = 1, ..., |G| : g_i \to g_j \}.$$
(4)



Figure 2: Reasoning about goals: the deliberation phase.

Definition 8 The precondition set $\Pi \subseteq G \times G$ is a binary relation on G, defining which goals are precondition of other goals. Formally,

$$\Pi = \{ (g_i, g_j) \mid i, j = 1, ..., |G| : g_i \mapsto g_j \}.$$
(5)

Definition 9 The dependence $\Delta \subseteq G \times G$ is a binary relation on G, defining which goals depend on other goals. Formally,

$$\Delta = \{ (g_i, g_j) \mid i, j = 1, \dots, |G| : g_i \hookrightarrow g_j \}.$$

$$(6)$$

Finally, on the basis of the above properties and relations we can now define the structure of the *goal model* of PRACTIONIST agents as follows

$$GM = \langle G, \, \Gamma, \, \Gamma', \, \Xi, \, \Pi, \, \Delta \rangle \tag{7}$$

where:

- G is the set of goals the agent could pursue;
- Γ is the *inconsistency* relation among goals;
- Γ' is the *preference* relation among inconsistent goals;
- Ξ is the *entailment* relation among goals;
- Π is the *precondition* relation among goals;
- Δ is the *dependence* relation among goals.

4 Reasoning about goals

In this section we show how the goal elements previously defined are used by PRACTIONIST agents when reasoning about goals during their deliberation process and the means-ends reasoning. We also highlight the actual relations between them and mental attitudes, i.e. desires and intentions.

In PRACTIONIST agents goals and their properties are defined on the basis of what agents believe. Thus, an agent will believe that a goal $g = \langle \sigma_g, \pi_g \rangle$ has succeeded if it believes that its success condition σ_q is true. The same holds for the other properties.

It is important to note that, in PRACTIONIST, desires and intentions are mental attitudes towards goals, which are in turn considered as descriptions of objectives. Thus, referring to a goal, an agent can just relate it to a *desire*, which it is not committed to because of several possible reasons (e.g. it believes that the goal is not possible). On the other hand, a goal can be related to an *intention*, that is the agent is actually and actively committed to pursue it.

Let $GM = \langle G, \Gamma, \Gamma', \Xi, \Pi, \Delta \rangle$ be a goal model of a PRACTIONIST agent α and, at a given time, $G' \subseteq G$ be the set of its active goals, which are those goals that the agent is already committed to.

Suppose that α starts its deliberation process and generates the goal $g = \langle \sigma_g, \pi_g \rangle$ as an option. Therefore the agent would like to commit to g, that is its *desire* is to bring about the goal g. However, since an agent will not be able to achieve all its desires, it performs the following process in the context of its deliberation phase (figure 2): the agent checks if it believes that the goal g is *possible* and not *inconsistent* (see definition 1) with active goals (belonging to G').

If both conditions hold the desire to pursue g will be promoted to an *intention*. Otherwise, in case of inconsistency among g and some active goals, the desire to pursue g will become an intention only if g is preferred to such inconsistent goals, which will in turn be dropped.

In any case, if the desire to pursue g is promoted to an *intention*, before starting the means-ends reasoning, the agent α checks if it believes that the goal g succeeds (that is, if it believes that the success condition σ_g holds) or whether the goal g is entailed (see definition 2) by some of the current active goals. In case of both above conditions do not hold, the agent will perform the means-ends reasoning, by either selecting a plan from a fixed plan library or dynamically generating a plan and finally executing it (details on this means-ends reasoning can be found in [9]).

Indeed, if the goal g succeeds or is entailed by some current active goals (i.e. some other means is working to achieve a goal that entails the goal g), there is no reason to pursue it. Therefore, the agent does not need to make any means-ends reasoning to figure out how to pursue the goal g.

Otherwise, before starting the means-ends reasoning, if some declared goals are precondition for q, the agent will first desire to pursue such goals and then the goal q.

In the PRACTIONIST framework, as a default, an agent will continue to maintain an intention until it believes that either such an intention has been achieved or it is no longer possible to achieve the intention. This commitment strategy to intention is called *single-minded commitment* [12]. In order to perform such a behaviour, the agent continuously checks if it believes that the goal g has just succeeded and that the goal g is still possible.

Moreover the agent checks if some dependee goal does not succeed. If so, it will desire to pursue such a goal and then continue pursuing the goal g. When all dependee goals succeed, the agent resumes the execution of the plan.

In order to be able to recover from *plan failures* and try other means to achieve an intention, if the selected plan fails or is no longer appropriate to achieve the intention, then the agent selects one of applicable *alternative plans* within the same intended means and executes it.

If none of the alternative plans was able to successfully pursue the goal g, the agent take into consideration the goals that *entail* g. Thus the agent selects one of them and considers it as an option, processing it in the way described in this section, from deliberation to means-ends reasoning.

If there is no plan to pursue alternative goals, the achievement of the intention has failed, as the agent has not other ways to pursue its intention. Thus, according to agents beliefs, the goal was *possible*, but the agent was no able to pursue it (i.e. there are no plans).

5 BDI Agent Patterns

The structure of patterns described in this section reflects a restricted version of the classical structure of design patterns presented by GoF [3]. Each section is named with the pattern *name*, which conveys the essence of the pattern succinctly. The *intent* states what the pattern does, its rationale, what particular design issue or problem it addresses. The *motivation* is a scenario that illustrates a design problem and how the entities in the pattern solve such a problem. The *structure* is a graphical representation of the entities in the pattern using a notation based on the Unified Modelling Language (UML). Then we provide more details about the entities participating in the design pattern and their responsibilities in the *participants* section. Finally, the *Implementation* describes how the proposed patterns can be implemented with the PRACTIONIST framework.

As stated above, intentions are mental attitudes towards goals, that is an intention always concerns with being committed to pursuing some goal. Thus, declaring some relations between goals according to the definition provided in section 3 and the agent reasoning presented in section 4 is equivalent to state the corresponding relations among the intentions to pursue each of those goals. Therefore, altough most of patterns refer to intentions and relations among intentions, the solution below are provided in terms of goals and relations among goals, given the semantics discussed in previous sections.

The Tileworld example was initially introduced in [10] as a system with a highly parameterized environment that could be used to investigate the reasoning in agents. The original Tileworld consists of a grid of cells on which tiles, obstacles and holes (of different size and point value) can exist. Each agent can move up, down left or right within the grid to pick up and move tiles in order to fill the holes. Each hole has an associated score, which is awarded to the agent that has filled the hole. The main goal of the agent is to score as many points as possible.

Tileworld simulations are dynamic and the environment changes continually over time. Since this environment is highly parameterized, the experimenter can alter various aspects of it through a set of available "knobs", such as the rate at which new holes appear (*dynamism*), the rate at which obstacles appear (*hostility*), difference in hole scores (*variability of utility*), and so forth.

Such applications, with a potentially high degree of dynamism, can benefit from the adoption of a goal-oriented design approach, where the abstraction of goal is used to declaratively represent agents' objectives and states of affairs that can be dynamically achieved through some means. ******

5.1 Dynamic Strategy Selection

Intent

An agent's intention can be achieved through a family of strategies, which have the same purpose but work in different operative conditions: the best strategy should be dynamically selected by the agent at run time.

Motivation

One of the key features of practical reasoning agents is the clear separation among the deliberation process and the means-ends reasoning. In this sense, providing such agents with the ability of dynamically selecting a strategy (better if it is the best one) to achieve the intention figured out by the deliberation process plays an important role when developing BDI agents.

Usually developers want to provide the agents with different strategies to achieve a given intention and let the agent be the responsible of applying the "best" strategy according to its beliefs and the current environment conditions. This would enable the development of more flexible agents by adopting a more modular and declarative approach.

Moreover, with the increasing complexity and maintenance cost of advanced software systems, in recent years attention has fallen on self-* systems and particularly on the autonomic computing approach and autonomic systems. In [7] authors argue that adopting a design approach that supports the definition of a space of possible behaviours related to the same function is one of the ways to make a system autonomic. Then the system should be able to autonompusly select at runtime the proper behaviour on the basis of the current situation.

In the Tileworld example, a player agent must find the holes to fill within the environment. In order to achieve such a intention, the agent could use several strategies according to the environment conditions, such as (i) finding the first hole by randomly moving within the grid, (ii) finding an hole by means of a breath first research, or (iii) finding the hole with the greatest value.

Obviously some strategy is better than others in terms of agent scores, but perhaps it cannot be applicable in certain environment conditions (e.g. very fastly changing conditions). Moreover, when the agent is trying to find an hole with a given strategy, if the environment conditions change, it can perceive this and dynamically change or adapt its research strategy according to the new situation.

Structure

The *agent* is provided with some *plans* each implementing a different **Strategy** to pursue a given *goal*. During the means-ends reasoning the *agent* performs the internal process **StrategySelector** to figure out the best *applicable* strategy *plan*, according to the *context* of declared *plans* and the current state of the world reflected into its *beliefs*.

Participants

• **Objective**: some *goals* the *agent* can pursue during its life-cycle by means of several strategies.



Figure 3: The structure of the Dynamic Strategy Selection pattern.

- **Strategy**: an abstract *plan* common to all concrete strategy *plans* that can be adopted to pursue the same **Objective**.
- StrategyA, StrategyB: two concrete *plans* the *agent* can use to pursue the same Objective in different ways.
- StrategySelector: an *agent process* that, in the context of the means-ends reasoning, has the responsibility of selecting and adopting a given concrete Strategy to pursue the Objective, if the conditions expressed by its *context* hold according to the agent's *belief*s. This provides the *agent* with some meta-level reasoning capabilities to select the best applicable strategy under any operational condition.

Implementation

The StrategySelector process is provided within the PRACTIONIST framework with a default behaviour that checks the context of each *practical* plan (see section 2), by invoking the applicable method of the class Plan. Therefore, each concrete strategy should be implemented as a sub-Plan of an abstract Plan which is *practical* for the considered *goal*. Each strategy sub-Plan should at least override both applicable and body methods.

5.2 Intention Decomposition

Intent

An agent's intention can be decomposed into a set of sub-intentions. Therefore, the main intention will be achieved as soon as all its sub-intentions are achieved.

Motivation

Often an agent is not able to achieve some high-level intentions. However, if the agent is aware that such an intention can be achieved if some other intentions are achieved, it can commit to them and indirectly bring about the main intention.

Actually, several analysis and design methodologies adopt a functional decomposition principle to describe and represent the expected functionalities of a system. Therefore, the ability to reason about intention decomposition relations can provide the agents with the capability of looking for alternative ways of achieving those intentions which it does not have a direct strategy/plan for.

In the Tileworld example, a player agent has to score as many points as possible. In order to "score points", the agent can "find a tile", "move to the (tile's) position", "pick up the tile", "move to the (hole's) position", and finally "fill the hole". All these objectives can be considered as contributors of the main goal "score points". Therefore, at a given moment if the agent is committed to "scoring points", it can autonomously commit itself to pursuing all the above-mentioned contributors.

Structure

The agent is provided with the *entailment* relation MainThroughABC between the *goal* MainObjective and its sub-*goals* (i.e. ObjectiveA, ObjectiveB, ObjectiveC).



Figure 4: The structure of the Intention Decomposition pattern.

This relation will be analysed by the agent during the *deliberation* in order to figure out alternative intentions (i.e. pursuing *contributor* goals) as soon as it is not able (due to some reason) to directly achieve the main intention (i.e. pursuing the main *goal*). In this case, all *contributors* will be automatically pursued in place of the *beneficiary*.

Moreover, the above relation will be also analysed by the agent during its *means-ends reasoning*. Indeed, if the agent is committed to pursuing the MainObjective and the agent is already committed to pursuing ObjectiveA, ObjectiveB, and ObjectiveC), there is no reason to actually look for a plan to achieve the *beneficiary*, as it will be achieved as soon as all its *contributors* are achieved.

Participants

- **ObjectiveA**, **ObjectiveB**, **ObjectiveC**: some *goals* the *agent* can pursue during its life-cycle.
- MainObjective: a goal that the agent can pursue by pursuing all contributors.
- MainThroughABC: a relation stating that *goal* MainObjective succeeds if all its *contributors* (i.e. ObjectiveA, ObjectiveB, ObjectiveC) succeed.
- EntailmentManager: an *agent process* that has the responsability of providing the set of *contributors* of a given *goal*.

Implementation

The PRACTIONIST framework provides the support for the definition/handling of agent goal models and the capabilities for reasoning about goals.

Figure 5 shows the actual structure of the GoalModel that each agent owns (PRACTIONISTAgent is the abstract class that has to be extended when developing PRACTIONIST agents). Such a model stores information about declared goals (with their internal properties, i.e. success and possibility condition) and the four types of relations these goals are involved in. Specifically the interface GoalRelation provides the super interface for all goal relations supported by the PRACTIONIST framework (i.e. EntailmentRel, InconsistencyRel, DependencyRel, and PreconditionRel) and defines the operation verifyRel, whose purpose is to check each specific relation.

In order to exploit the features provided by the goal model and understand if a given goal the agent desires to pursue is inconsistent with or implied by some active goals, the agent must



Figure 5: The structure of the support for the goal model in the PRACTIONIST framework.

have information about such active goals and whether them are related to either desires or intentions. Therefore, each PRACTIONIST agent owns an ActiveGoalsHandler component, which, with the aid of the GoalModel, has the responsibility of keeping track of all executing intended means stacks with the corresponding waiting and executing goals and managing requests made by the agent. Thus, at any given time, the ActiveGoalsHandler is aware of current desires and intentions of the agent, referring them to active goals.

Therefore, the PRACTIONIST framework fully supports this pattern, as developers should only define the entailment relation between a goal and the set of its contributors (by implementing the interface EntailmentRel) and then add such relation into the agent's GoalModel (through the method add). Then the agent will use it as described in section 4.

5.3 Mutually Exclusive Intentions

Intent

An agent could have two incompatible intentions, which cannot be achieve simultaneously.

Motivation

When developers want to specify that an agent has two intentions that are inconsistent with each other, the agent itself should not work to simultaneosly achieve both intentions. It should choose only one of them and perform some activities to achieve it. The developer should specify such a desired behaviour declaratively.

In the Tileworld environment, there are several inconsistent objectives that the agent must avoid to pursue at the same time. As an example, a player agent should not simultaneosly intend to go toward a hole and toward a different hole. Thus, the agent should work to achieve only one of them and drop the other intention.

Structure

The agent is provided with an *inconsistence* relation (see definition 1) between the two goals representing potential intentions (figure 6).

These relations will be analysed by the agent during the deliberation phase in order guarantee that at any moment the agent itself is not trying to achieve both intentions (i.e. pursuing the **ObjectiveA** and pursuing the **ObjectiveB**), by maintaining the preferred one and dropping the other goal.

Participants



Figure 6: The structure of the Mutually Exclusive Intentions pattern.

- ObjectiveA, ObjectiveB: some goals the agent can pursue during its life-cycle.
- AxorB: a relation stating the *inconsistence* between the goals ObjectiveA and ObjectiveB.
- InconsistenceManager: the *agent process* that has the responsability of checking whether two declared goals are inconsistent or not (i.e. checkInconsistentGoals). Then, the *agent* must guarantee that at any moment inconsistent or incompatible goals (e.g. ObjectiveA and ObjectiveB) are not pursued simultaneously.

Implementation

This pattern can be easily adopted when developing BDI agents with the PRACTIONIST framework. With reference to figure 5, developers should only define the inconsistence relation (by implementing the interface InconsistencyRel) and add such a relation into the agent's GoalModel (through the method add). Then the agent will use it during the deliberation process as described in section 4.

It should be noted that with the PRACTIONIST framework developers can also specify the preference between two inconsistent goals.

5.4 Necessary Intention

Intent

An agent must achieve an intention I_d before trying to achieve a given intention I. Sometimes the intention I_d must be maintained even while the agent is pursuing the intention I.

Motivation

Sometimes it is useful to specify that some agent intentions must be achieved so that it is possible working to achieve other intentions. In this case, when an agent is committed to a given intention, if there are some dependee intentions that must be achieved before, the agent should first perform activities to achieve them. Often, the dependee intentions must be achieved even when working to achieve the dependent intention.

In the Tileworld example, a player agent aims at maximizing its score by filling holes. However, a player agent should find a tile and hold it before working to actually fill a hole. Therefore, the objective "fill a hole" requires that the goals "find a tile" and "hold a tile" have been achieved.

Structure

The agent is provided with some *dependence* relation between some goals. Since intentions are mental attitudes towards goals, these relations will be analysed by the agent during the deliberation phase in order to pursue dependee goals before (and sometimes while) pursuing the dependent goal.



Figure 7: The structure of the *Necessary Intention* pattern.

Participants

- ObjectiveA, ObjectiveB: some goals the agent can pursue during its life-cycle.
- Necessary: a relation stating that the *goal* ObjectiveA depends on the goal ObjectiveB, that is the latter should be achieved before (and in some cases even maintained while) pursuing the former.
- **DependenceManager**: the *agent process* that has the responsability of checking if there is some *dependence* relation between ObjectiveA and ObjectiveB, in order to let the agent guarantee that the dependee goal is achieved before (and in some cases even maintained while) pursuing the dependent goal.

Implementation

The PRACTIONIST framework supports the adoption of this pattern. With reference to figure 5, developers should only define either the *dependence* or the *precondition* relation (by implementing either the interface DependenceRel or PreconditionRel) according to whether the dependee goal must be maintained while pursuing the dependent goal or not. Then the relation has to be added into the agent's GoalModel (through the method add). Then the agent will use it during the deliberation process as described in section 4.

It should be noted that with the PRACTIONIST framework developers can also specify the preference between two inconsistent goals.

6 Conclusions and Future Work

In the PRACTIONIST framework, desires and intentions are mental attitudes towards goals, which are in turn considered as descriptions of objectives.

In this paper we described how a declarative representation of goals can support the definition of desires and intentions in PRACTIONIST agents. It also supports the detection and the resolution of conflicts among agents' objectives and activities. This results in a reduction of the gap between BDI theories and several available implementations.

We also described how goals and relations are used by PRACTIONIST agents during their deliberation process and the execution of their activities; particularly it is described how agents manages these activities by using the support for the goal model shown in the previous sections.

It should be noted that, unlike several BDI and non-BDI agent platforms, the PRACTIONIST framework supports the declarative definition of goals and the relations among them, as described in this paper. This provides the ability to *believe* if goals are impossible, already achieved, incompatible with other goals, and so forth. This in turn supports the *commitment strategies* of agents and their ability to autonomously drop, reconsider, replace or pursue intentions related to active goals.

The ability of PRACTIONIST agents to reason about goals and the relations among them (as described in section 4) lets programmers implicitly specify several behaviours for several circumstances, without having to explicitly code such behaviours, letting agents figure out the right activity to perform on the basis of the current state and the relations among its potential objectives.

Goals can be adopted throughout the whole development process. Thus, we are defining a development methodology where goals play a central role and maintain the same semantics from early requirements to the implementation phase.

Unlike several BDI and non-BDI agent platforms, the PRACTIONIST framework supports the declarative definition of goals and the relations among them. This provides the ability to believe if goals are impossible, already achieved, incompatible with other goals, and so forth. This in turn supports the commitment strategies of agents and their ability to autonomously drop, reconsider, replace or pursue intentions related to active goals. The ability to reason about goals and the relations among them lets PRACTIONIST agents to figure out the right activity to perform on the basis of its actual and potential objectives and the current state of the world. In the PRACTIONIST context is not easy speaking about "a specific recurring design problem" due to the lack in developing real application using this new framework; with the following pattern definitions we will try to provide some guideline to take advantage from goal model and meta-level reasoning that represent, in own opinion, an innovation in the goal oriented design of multi agent system

As a part of our future strategy, we aims at extending the proposed model with further properties of goals and relations among them. Finally, we aim at applying the concepts and the model described in this paper in the development of real-world applications based on BDI agents.

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